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This paper introduces an approach to the study of optimal government policy in economies 
characterized by a coordination problem and multiple equilibria. Such models are often criticized 
as not being useful for policy analysis because they fail to assign a unique prediction to each 
possible policy choice. We employ a selection mechanism that assigns, ex ante, a probability to 
each equilibrium indicating how likely it is to obtain. We show how such a mechanism can be 
derived as the natural result of an adaptive learning process. This approach leads to a well-defined 
optimal policy problem, and has important implications for the conduct of government policy. We 
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In a wide variety of situations, a government or policymaker must decide on a policy before private
agents choose their actions. For example, a government that wants to subsidize investment must set the sub-
sidy rate before agents choose their investment plans. In making this decision, the policymaker anticipates
that the ﬁnal outcome will be an equilibrium allocation of the economy with the chosen policy. Together
with a measure of social welfare, this leads to a well-deﬁned optimal policy problem if the economy has
a unique equilibrium for each possible policy choice. However, many economic models possess multiple
equilibria. Formulating the optimal policy problem in this case is problematic: at which of the equilibrium
allocations should welfare be evaluated? In addition, it seems possible that actions taken by the policy-
maker may in some way affect which equilibrium will obtain. In such situations, therefore, formulating the
optimal policy problem requires a theory of how the policy choice affects the equilibrium selection process.
In this paper, we provide such a theory for coordination-problem economies with identical agents and mul-
tiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. Our approach is to assign a probability to each equilibrium indicating how
likely it is to obtain. We show how an adaptive learning process naturally generates such probabilities. This
approach leads to a well-deﬁned optimal policy problem that takes into account the effects of the policy on
the selection process. We demonstrate through examples that these effects are intuitively appealing and can
change the policy prescription of a model in interesting ways.
Our examples are related to problems of technology adoption and technology choice in the presence of
network externalities. In such situations, there are often two (symmetric, pure-strategy) equilibria – one
where the good technology is adopted by all agents and one where a bad technology is used. These are
typically both strict equilibria, neither of which is easily reﬁned away. Interesting policy questions arise in
such environments. For example, consider the issue of the taxation of Internet access and purchases made
over the Internet. The arguments both for and against special tax treatment of Internet transactions are
numerous, but one of the arguments strikes us as being of particular theoretical interest. The argument is
based on the idea that there are large network externalities which generate multiple equilibria with differing
levels of e-commerce activity.1 To keep things simple, suppose there are two equilibria. In one, the e-
commerce market is small and engaging in e-commerce is not very proﬁtable, leading few people to do
so. In the other, the market is large and very efﬁcient, leading many people to engage in e-commerce. E-
commerce is claimed to be more efﬁcient than traditional distribution methods, so that the latter equilibrium
socially dominates the former. By giving e-commerce transactions preferential tax treatment, the argument
goes, the government can encourage the economy to settle into the better equilibrium. In other words,
1 See Zittrain and Nesson (2000) for one statement of this argument in the popular press. The debate on this topic is lively and
ongoing. In the U.S., the Internet Tax Freedom Act was extended in November 2001 for two more years, meaning that the issue is
still very much undecided.
1the proposed policy is an attempt to affect the process by which an equilibrium is selected. This type of
argument raises a variety of questions: How signiﬁcant is the impact of the government on the selection
process? Will a large enough subsidy ensure that the high e-commerce equilibrium obtains? If so, is such a
large subsidy optimal? Our goal is to provide a formal way of addressing these types of questions.
There is ample evidence from the historical and experimental literatures that both Pareto-dominant and
Pareto-dominated equilibria are observed in coordination-problem environments (see Cooper, 1999, for a
review of these literatures). Therefore, using a deterministic selection criterion such as assuming that the
Pareto-best equilibrium will obtain does not seem to describe such settings well. If both equilibria are
possible, however, we need to be able to assign probabilities to them in order for the government to have a
well-deﬁned optimal policy problem. The obvious question is where such probabilities would come from.
In some economies, it is intuitively clear that one equilibrium should be more likely to obtain than the other.
As an example, consider the problem of an individual agent deciding whether to engage in e-commerce or
traditional commerce. To simplify the story, suppose she believes that the e-commerce market will settle on
either a “thick” or a “thin” equilibrium. Suppose further that the gain from choosing e-commerce is large
if the market is thick and that the loss from choosing e-commerce is small (near zero) if the market is thin.
Then the large potential payoff will lead her to choose e-commerce for a wide range of beliefs about what
other agents will do. If all agents are in a similar situation, then it seems intuitively more likely that the
economy will coordinate to the thick-market equilibrium. In other words, the thick-market equilibrium is
risk dominant in the terminology of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), and it seems reasonable to expect that a
risk-dominant equilibrium is more likely to obtain than a risk-dominated one. How much more likely would
seem to depend on the strength of its risk dominance.
We propose using an equilibrium selection mechanism that captures this view in a systematic way. To do
so, we suppose that the probability assigned to each equilibrium is negatively related to the risk factor of the
equilibrium. The risk factor of the thick-market equilibrium is the smallest probability that an individual
agent can place on the e-commerce market being thick and still be willing to choose e-commerce. Our
mechanism therefore assigns a high probability to the thick-market equilibrium when agents are willing
to choose e-commerce for a wide range of beliefs. Because the government’s policy choice changes the
payoffs associated with agents’ actions, it will also affect the risk factor and hence the probability of each
equilibrium. In choosing a policy, the government must take this effect into account. The optimal policy
derived under our approach typically differs from that derived using any deterministic selection criterion.
We show, for example, that it is generally not optimal to choose the policy that maximizes the (utility) value
of the good equilibrium. The reason is that, by deviating in some direction, there is a ﬁrst-order gain in
the likelihood of attaining the equilibrium, but no ﬁrst-order loss in the value of that equilibrium. We also
2show that even when it is feasible to eliminate the bad equilibrium, it may not be optimal to do so. It may
be optimal to allow the bad outcome to occur with low probability in exchange for a higher (utility) value
if the good equilibrium occurs. In general, our technology-adoption examples indicate that subsidies can
have strong effects on equilibrium selection in environments with network externalities.
Addressing quantitative issues such as ﬁnding the optimal subsidy level obviously requires going beyond
qualitative statements about how the probabilities depend on the risk factors. We show how an adaptive
learning process can be used to assign an explicit probability to each equilibrium. In particular, we build
on the learning process of Howitt and McAfee (1992) and show that it converges to one of the (symmetric,
pure-strategy) equilibria of our model. To which equilibrium the economy converges depends in part on
the particular realizations of uncertainty along the learning path. Hence convergence is stochastic and the
learning process naturally generates a probability distribution over the set of equilibria. We demonstrate that
the probability assigned to each equilibrium by the learning process is in fact negatively related to the risk
factor of the equilibrium. In the context of the e-commerce example, because giving Internet transactions
preferential tax treatment lowers the risk factor of the high e-commerce equilibrium, it enlarges the set of
beliefs for which agents are willing to choose e-commerce. During the learning process, therefore, agents
are more likely to become “optimistic enough” to begin coordinating on high levels of e-commerce, which
in turn makes convergence to the high e-commerce equilibrium more likely. Hence the learning process
generates an equilibrium selection mechanism with precisely the intuitively-desirable properties discussed
above.
The idea of using adaptive processes to determine whether or not a particular rational expectations
equilibrium is a plausible outcome is, of course, not new.2 The approach has received increasing attention in
recent years, particularly in macroeconomics (see, for example, Sargent ,1993, and Evans and Honkapohja,
2001, as well as the many references therein). Much of this literature focuses on the stability or instability
(appropriately deﬁned) of a particular equilibrium and uses this as a selection criterion – unstable equilibria
can safely be ignored. Our problem differs from this literature in that both equilibria we focus on are stable
inthe sense thattheycanbe approachedwith positive probability.3 Hencewemust lookbeyondthequestion
of stability and assign a probability to each equilibrium in order to formulate an optimal policy problem.
Experimental evidence lends strong support to this probabilistic view of equilibrium selection. Van Huyck,
Battalio, and Beil (1990, 1991) report that, in a series of coordination-game experiments, the frequency
with which the subjects converged to each equilibrium varied systematically with the treatment variables.
In other words, the ex ante probability distribution across equilibria was nondegenerate and, in addition,
2 See, for example, the survey by Blume, Bray, and Easley (1982).
3 This issue also arises in other types of models. For example, Evans and Honkapohja (1994) show that multiple stable equilibria
can arise in linear rational expectations models.
3was affected by small changes in the structure of the game, such as changes in the payoff associated with
each action.4 This is exactly the type of behavior displayed by the learning-based selection mechanism that
we study.
Our approach also stands in contrast to that of Morris and Shin (1998), which uses informational imper-
fections to eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in a related coordination game.5 We perform equilibrium
selection for a given economy, whereas they change the economy so that the equilibrium is unique. In
particular, they change the informational structure so that agents receive different signals about economic
fundamentals and must act on the basis of this (incomplete) information. The result is, in general, not an
equilibrium of the original economy. We keep the original economy as our fundamental object of interest
and study an adaptive learning process that converges to an equilibrium of this economy. In their approach,
economic fundamentals (and the information structure) determine how agents will coordinate; equilibrium
selection is deterministic. In our probabilistic approach, chance plays an important role, with the economic
fundamentals determining the probabilities. Our approach is therefore closer in spirit to the sunspots-based
approach used, for example, by Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Peck and Shell (2003). In those papers, a strate-
gic agent (a debt-issuing government in the former case and a bank in the latter) must choose a policy which
determines whether or not multiple equilibria exist. Eliminating the bad equilibrium (a debt crisis or a bank
run) is costly. The probability of the sunspot state(s) in which agents choose the bad action is a parameter
of the economy, and hence the probability that the bad equilibrium will occur (if it exists) is independent
of the action chosen by the strategic agent. Our learning-based selection mechanism, in contrast, assigns
a probability to each equilibrium that depends on the fundamentals of the economy, including the chosen
policy. The approach therefore allows us to investigate how government policy can inﬂuence the likelihood
of coordination to the good outcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out a basic coordination-
problem model, and we discuss the problem of determining an optimal policy when there may be multiple
equilibria. In Section 3, we introduce a probabilistic equilibrium selection mechanism with certain desirable
properties and derive the implications of such a mechanism for the optimal policy in a simple example. In
Section 4, we analyze in detail the equilibrium selection mechanism generated by the learning process of
Howitt and McAfee (1992), and in Section 5 we use this learning-based mechanism to compute the optimal
policy in a more general model of technology choice under network externalities. Finally, in Section 6 we
provide a summary of the results and offer some concluding remarks.
4 See Crawford (2001) for an interesting discussion of these results and for an estimation of a general learning model using the
experimental data.
5 See also Morris and Shin (2002), which provides a detailed discussion of this global-games-based approach, along with a
survey of applications.
42 The Model
In this section, we describe an abstract coordination-problem model and the resulting equilibria. We
consider economies with a [0,1] continuum of identical agents and with two symmetric, pure-strategy
equilibria. Because we focus on symmetric equilibria with identical agents, social welfare is the same
as individual welfare and hence is well deﬁned.
2.1 The Environment and Equilibrium
Each agent must choose an action a from the set A. We assume that agents face a binary decision, in
addition to other payoff-relevant choices. Therefore, we model the agents’ choice set as
A = {g,b}×X, where X ⊂ RN.
We will later interpret g as choosing the “good” technology and b as choosing the “bad” one, with x ∈ X
representing the amount of investment in the chosen technology. The analog of this binary choice in game-
theoretic analysis is the 2 × 2 game that has received so much attention in the literature on equilibrium
selection.6
There is a (benevolent) government that chooses a policy τ from a set T ⊂ R. We assume that the set T
includes zero, which has the natural interpretation of a “passive” or laissez-faire policy. In addition, there
is aggregate uncertainty represented by the variable c ∈ C ⊂ R. The distribution of c is given by f.T h e
utility of each agent depends on each of these variables and on the average action in the economy a; this
external effect is what will generate multiple equilibria. Because there is a continuum of agents, we have a
truly competitive economy and each agent correctly perceives her own action to have no effect on a. Each
agent’s utility is given by the function
V : A × A × T × C → R,
where A is the convex hull of A. We assume that agents have rational expectations: each agent correctly
anticipates the value of a and knows the distribution f of c. The government policy is also commonly




V (a,a,τ,c)df (c). (1)
We now deﬁne a rational expectations equilibrium; we focus on symmetric outcomes in pure strategies.
6 See, for example, Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), and Matsui and Matsuyama (1995).
5Deﬁnition: A symmetric rational-expectations equilibrium is an a∗ ∈ A such that a∗ solves problem (1)
when the value of a is held constant at a∗.
Our interest is in situations where there is more than one such equilibrium for at least some values of τ.
It is well known in the literature on coordination problems that some degree of payoff complementarity is
necessary for the existence of multiple equilibria (see Cooper and John, 1988), so we are assuming that the
V function has this property. In Sections 3 and 5, we work through explicit examples where this is the case.
It is worth pointing out here that under rational expectations, the timing of the choices of the elements
of the vector a does not matter (as long as all agents make each choice simultaneously). For example,
suppose that all agents ﬁrst make the binary choice (g or b), and then observe the binary choices of others
before making the continuous choice x. The set of rational expectations equilibria in this environment is
exactly the same as in an environment where all choices are made simultaneously. We have left the timing
unspeciﬁed because we view our rational-expectations model as applying to any of these environments.
Deﬁne x∗
g as the solution to
x∗














g will be the value taken by x in an equilibrium where all agents choose g (if such an equilibrium
exists). We assume that this equation has a unique solution. The utility value to each agent of being in this
















We similarly deﬁne the utility that an agent would receive from choosing b (and then choosing x optimally)
when (almost) every other agent is choosing g by













We assume that Vgg (τ) >V bg (τ) holds for all τ ∈ T, meaning that an equilibrium where all agents
choose g always (strictly) exists. We deﬁne x∗
b,V bb (τ), and Vgb(τ) in an analogous way. We assume
that Vbb (0) >V gb(0) holds, so that an equilibrium where all agents choose b (strictly) exists when the
government is passive. Finally, we assume that Vgg (τ) >V bb (τ) holds for all τ ∈ T,so that the equilibria
are clearly Pareto ranked: g is always the “good” equilibrium and b the “bad” one.
62.2 The Optimal Policy Problem
We now turn our attention to the problem of determining the optimal policy. The traditional approach is
to focus on a particular equilibrium, which might be selected by a formal rule or might be the focus of
attention solely because it has some desirable properties. The government recognizes, of course, that the
equilibrium action x∗
j is a function of τ. The benevolent government chooses its policy to maximize the




where j is either g or b depending on which of the two equilibria was selected. We denote the solution to
this problem by τ∗
j, where the subscript indicates that this isthe optimal policy when the policymaker knows
that equilibrium j will obtain. A problem with this approach is that the resulting optimal policy typically
depends on which equilibrium was selected; that is, we typically have τ∗
g 6= τ∗
b. As we mentioned above, the
evidence on coordination games indicates that in many cases a unique equilibrium simply cannot be singled
out as the prediction of the model. As a result, this approach does not yield a clear policy prescription.
Suppose instead that we allow for an equilibrium selection mechanism that assigns a probability to the
occurrence of each equilibrium.
Deﬁnition: An equilibrium selection mechanism is a function π : T → [0,1] that assigns, for each policy
choice τ, a probability π(τ) to the good equilibrium and (1 − π (τ)) to the bad equilibrium. We require
that π(τ)=1hold if the bad equilibrium does not exist for that policy choice.
Onestandardapproachtoequilibriumselectionistoassumethatagentscoordinatetheiractionsbasedonthe
realization of a sunspot variable. Suppose that after the government policy is set but before private agents
make their choices, an extrinsic, publicly-observed state of nature s is drawn from the uniform distribution
on [0,1]. Suppose further that if τ is such that both the good and the bad equilibrium exist, all agents





if s ≤ π; otherwise choose (b,x∗
b)” for some number π.T h e ni nt h e
resulting sunspot equilibrium, π is the ex ante probability that the good equilibrium will obtain. We work
directly with the probabilities of the equilibria, but one can view our equilibrium selection mechanism as
a function that gives the cutoff value π in a fully-speciﬁed sunspots model for each possible policy choice.
The standard sunspots approach is to assume that π is independent of τ (as long as both equilibria exist).
Our deﬁnition allows for this possibility, but also allows for the cutoff value to vary with the policy choice.
Once a probability is assigned to each equilibrium, the natural goal of the government is to maximize
7the expected utility of agents across equilibria. The optimal policy problem is therefore
max
τ∈T
π(τ)Vgg (τ)+( 1− π (τ))Vbb (τ). (4)
Recalling the deﬁnitions of Vgg and Vbb above (see (2)), we see that τ inﬂuences the value of the objective
function in three ways: (i) by directly affecting the value V, (ii) by affecting the equilibrium action x∗
j,
and (iii) by affecting the equilibrium selection mechanism π. Deriving the optimal policy this way leads
to interesting and sometimes surprising results, as we demonstrate through examples below. To gain some
intuition here, suppose that π and V are differentiable in τ. Then the ﬁrst-order condition for this problem
is
π (τ)V 0
gg (τ)+( 1− π(τ))V 0
bb (τ)+π0 (τ)(Vgg (τ) − Vbb (τ)) = 0. (5)
This is in many ways the central equation of the paper; its solution is the optimal policy τ∗.I ts a y st h a t
the optimal policy is the result of the balancing of three forces. One must consider not only the effect of
the policy on the utility of agents in each of the two equilibria, but also the effect of the policy on the
equilibrium selection mechanism. Note that the ﬁrst-order condition under the standard sunspots approach,
where π is independent of τ, would consist of the ﬁrst two terms on the left-hand side of equation (5),
but not the third.7 Including the effect of the policy on the probability of reaching each equilibrium is the
distinguishing characteristic of our approach. It is also important to note that the solution to the traditional
optimal policy problem (3) is misleading even in the case where τ∗
g = τ∗
b happens to hold. That is, even
when the same policy would maximize welfare in both equilibria, this will not be the optimal policy if a
small deviation can increase the probability of reaching the good equilibrium. We now present an example
to illustrate the implications of equation (5) for the optimal subsidy level in a simple model of network
externalities.8
3 A Leading Example
In this section we consider a simple model of network externalities that captures some of the crucial
features of the Internet sales tax debate. In this model, each agent gains utility from “transacting” with
other agents. These transactions occur through one of two technologies: g (the “good” one) represents
Internet transactions and b (the “bad” one) traditional store-based methods. Transacting requires effort, and
we denote the agent’s choice of effort level by xi ∈ [0,∞). The utility cost of this effort is quadratic.
7 It is worth pointing out here that even under the standard sunspots approach, the outcome of the model with probabilistic





be affected by the sunspot variable because the policymaker’s choice of τ will depend on π. In this sense, the policymaker in our
model plays a role similar to that of the unrestricted consumers in Cass and Shell (1983).
8 While our examples below deal with network externalities in investment, we should emphasize that this methodology is
applicable to a wide range of environments. For example, in Ennis and Keister (2002a) we study the implications of equation (5)
in a model of bank runs.
8The utility derived from transacting depends on the productivity of the transactions technology, which is
















The term xg is the total amount of effort employed by agents using technology g, that is, xg =
R
Γ xidi,
where Γ is the set of agents using technology g. The function h is increasing and strictly concave; higher
levels of total effort in technology g make each agent using the technology more productive. In other words,
Internet-based transacting becomes more efﬁcient as more people use it. We assume that h(0) > 0 holds,
so that the good technology is productive even if no one else is using it. We also assume the Inada-type
condition h0 (x) → 0 as x →∞ . The ﬁxed cost c of operating technology g is stochastic. However,
because the cost enters utility additively in this example, only the expected cost c will matter in a rational
expectations equilibrium.
Due to the externalities, it is natural for the government to consider intervening to encourage effort in
technology g.We assume that the government does this by subsidizing such effort. Let τ ∈ [0,1) be the rate
of ad valorem subsidy and let Θ be the lump-sum tax (on all agents) that ﬁnances this subsidy. This subsidy
can be thought of as the discount from the standard sales tax that Internet transactions receive. A passive
government would charge the same tax rate on both types of transactions. An active government would
lower the rate on Internet commerce, effectively subsidizing electronic transactions. The subsidy would be
paid for by all agents through either higher taxes on other activities or reduced government expenditures.
Since the subsidy in our model is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax (which affects neither the efﬁciency nor the
cost of effort of technology b), we are effectively assuming that the government does not raise the tax rate
on traditional commerce to pay for the e-commerce subsidy.
3.1 Equilibrium
We ﬁrst examine the set of rational expectations equilibria for a given government policy. If the agent








The solution to this problem is given by xi = 1
a. If instead the agent chooses technology g, her problem is
max
xi




i − c − Θ, (6)





9The agent then compares the expected utility given by each technology and chooses the more promising
one. This choice clearly depends on the agent’s beliefs about xg.W eﬁrst look for an equilibrium where
all agents choose technology g and xg is positive. From equation (7), the equilibrium effort level would be


















− c − Θ,








This is an equilibrium as long as no individual agent is made better off by choosing technology b. That is,
we need




to hold. We assume that the parameter values are such that we have Vgg (0) >V bg (0) = Vbb, so that this
good equilibrium exists and Pareto dominates the bad outcome when the government is passive. Straight-
forward calculations show that the difference (Vgg − Vbg) is strictly increasing in τ, and therefore the good
equilibrium exists for all subsidy levels.
We also assume that the parameter values are such that the bad equilibrium exists when the government
is passive (otherwise the problem of equilibrium selection does not arise). In other words, we require that








hold. This condition does not, however, imply that the bad equilibrium exists for all values of τ. By setting





the government can eliminate the bad equilibrium (and thus be sure that the good equilibrium will obtain).
3.2 Equilibrium Selection and the Optimal Policy
In the introduction we argued that, intuitively, it seems that the probability assigned to each of the equilibria
should be related to the notion of risk dominance. We now make this relationship precise by using the
risk factors of the equilibria. Following Young (1998), we deﬁne the risk factor of equilibrium g to be the





with probability strictly greater than
ρg (and (b,x∗






b).9 The risk factor
9 Young’s deﬁnition applies to 2 × 2 games, but the extension to our setting is straightforward. Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995)




. The risk factor measures how willing an agent is to choose an
equilibrium action when she is unsure of what the market conditions will be. When an equilibrium has a
low risk factor, agents are willing to choose that action for a wide range of beliefs, and therefore we should
expect that the economy is very likely to coordinate on that outcome. In other words, the probability of
each equilibrium should be a decreasing function of its risk factor. For the example in this section, the risk
factor is given by
ρg =








Notice that ρg is strictly decreasing in the subsidy rate τ; a higher subsidy makes an agent willing to adopt
the good technology for a wider range of beliefs about market conditions. Therefore, if the probability of
the good equilibrium π is decreasing in its risk factor, then this probability will be increasing in the subsidy
rate. We now state this property as an assumption, and derive the resulting policy implications. We make
the assumption in terms of derivatives only to keep the exposition simple. In the next section, we derive the
properties of the function π generated by an adaptive learning mechanism.
Assumption: π0 (τ) > 0 for all τ < τ.
The simplicity of the present example allows us to gain a fair amount of insight into the nature of the
optimal policy problem. The utility value of the bad equilibrium is independent of the policy chosen. (If no
one engages in Internet transactions, the sales tax rate on such transactions is irrelevant). This implies that
the same policy choice is (weakly) optimal for both equilibria, and therefore the traditional optimal policy
problem (3) gives a clear policy prescription. In other words, one might be tempted to think that the issue
of equilibrium selection can be safely ignored here, because τ∗
g is an optimal choice regardless of which
equilibrium is selected. However, as we have argued above, the correct problem to solve is (4), which for
this example simpliﬁes to
max
τ∈T
π (τ)(Vgg (τ) − Vbb). (9)
There are two cases to consider. If we have
τ∗
g > τ,
then the policy that maximizes the utility value of the good equilibrium also eliminates the bad equilib-
rium, ensuring that the good equilibrium will obtain. In this case, correcting the externality present in the
good technology is sufﬁcient to make that technology a dominant choice and therefore to eliminate the
coordination problem. When this happens, τ∗
g is clearly the optimal policy.
The more interesting case is where the coordination problem remains even when the externality is being
introduce the related notion of p-dominance for two-player, multi-action games. In the binary-choice environment, the risk factor
of equilibrium j is equal to the smallest number p such that the action proﬁle where both agents choose j is p-dominant.
11corrected, or when we have
τ∗
g < τ.
In this case, the government faces a tradeoff. By increasing the subsidy level above τ∗
g, it can increase the
probability that thegood equilibrium obtains. However, such high subsidylevels make the good equilibrium
less attractive. This tradeoff is illustrated in the two panels of Figure 1. For each value of τ, we plot the pair
Figure 1: Optimal policy
(Vgg − Vbb,π) generated by the policy. The point generated by τ =0 , for example, has a value of π strictly
between zero and one, since we assumed that both equilibria (strictly) exist when the government is passive.
As we increase τ, we trace out a curve of feasible points. The arrows in the ﬁgure indicate the direction of
movement along the curve as τ increases. Initially, both Vgg and π are increasing in τ. When we reach the
policy τ∗
g, we know that Vgg is at its maximum level. For higher subsidies, Vgg starts to fall, but π continues
to increase until it reaches unity at subsidy level τ. Increasing τ beyond τ is clearly inefﬁcient as π cannot
increase further and Vgg continues to decrease.
The level curves of the objective function in (9) are hyperbolas. If eliminating the bad equilibrium is
not very costly, as in part (a) of the ﬁgure, then τ is the optimal policy. If the situation is as in part (b)
of the ﬁgure, however, the optimal policy will fall somewhere strictly between τ∗
g and τ. In particular, it
should be clear from the diagram that the optimal policy will never be τ∗
g. This is because increasing τ a
little past this point causes a small (second-order) loss in the value of the good equilibrium and brings a
12larger (ﬁrst-order) increase in the probability of reaching that equilibrium. We summarize these results in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If τ∗
g ≥ τ holds, the optimal subsidy rate is τ∗
g.I fτ∗
g < τ holds, the optimal subsidy rate
is greater than τ∗
g. In the latter case, we can have either (i) τ∗ = τ, in which case the optimal policy
eliminates the bad equilibrium, or (ii) τ∗ < τ, in which case the optimal policy allows the bad equilibrium
to occur with positive probability.
For the case where the solution is interior (as in part (b) of the ﬁgure), the result can also be seen from
equation (5). For this example, V 0
bb (τ) is always zero. At τ∗
g, the derivative of Vgg is zero, but because
π0 (τ) is positive the left-hand side of the equation is positive; expected utility is still increasing in τ.O n l y
by increasing τ further and making V 0
gg negative can the ﬁrst-order condition be made to hold.
What does this analysis tell us about the debate over taxing Internet transactions? The model tells us that
Internetcommerceshouldbesubsidizedfortworeasons. Theﬁrstisstraightforward–weassumedthatthere
is a network externality that should be corrected. However, the optimal subsidy level is necessarily higher
than the level that would just correct the externality because higher subsidies make the good equilibrium
more likely to obtain. This second reason for the subsidy is new to our approach and can only be seen in
a model where the subsidy can affect the equilibrium selection process. In addition, as part (b) of Figure
1 shows, it may not be optimal to subsidize e-commerce so much that the good equilibrium is certain to
obtain. Instead, it may be optimal for the economy to face some risk over which equilibrium is selected
because eliminating the bad equilibrium is too costly.
So far we have taken the equilibrium selection mechanism π as given and assumed that it possesses some
desirable properties (such as being increasing in the subsidy rate). In the next section, we turn our attention
to the important question of where this function might come from.
4 Deriving a Probabilistic Equilibrium Selection Mechanism
In this section, we describe how the learning process in Howitt and McAfee (1992) can be used to
generate an equilibrium selection mechanism that has the intuitively-appealing properties discussed above.
Studying learning in our model requires changing the information possessed by agents so that there is
something for them to learn about. In addition to the endogenous uncertainty about each other’s actions, we
introduce uncertainty about the distribution f of the exogenous random variable c. This means that agents
need to learn about the fundamentals of the economy while they learn about market conditions, and the
coevolution of their beliefs about the two objects will determine where the process converges.
Our interpretation of the learning process is similar to that in Lucas (1986), which advocates using
learning to investigate the plausibility of different equilibria. We do not think of the learning process as
an accurate description of the short-run behavior of the economy. Rather, we view it as a mechanism that
13provides a good approximation of the likelihood with which the agents in the economy will coordinate on
each of the equilibria. We therefore think of learning as occurring in “fast time” or artiﬁcial time, and we
evaluate welfare only at the limiting points (the equilibria of the static model).10
The learning process takes place over an inﬁnite sequence of discrete (artiﬁcial) time periods t =
0,1,2,... Each period is like the static model of Section 2, except that agents do not necessarily have
rational expectations. An agent faces two sources of uncertainty: the cost variable c and the “market condi-
tions” variable a. We assume that the cost variable can only take on two values, cH and cL,w i t hcH >c L.
Hence f is a Bernoulli distribution; let p be the probability of cL. During the learning process, agents do
not know the value of p. Instead, they begin with a common prior that is diffuse, i.e., a uniform distribution
over [0,1].11 In each period, the actual cost ct (which is common to all agents) is an independent draw from
the true distribution f, and agents use this information to update their belief about p. Because all agents
begin with the same prior and observe the same information, they hold identical beliefs about p at every
point in time.
Agents treat the uncertainty about market conditions a in the same way. In particular, it is assumed
that in each period agents know that at will be one of the equilibrium values from the static model, either
(g,x∗
g) or (b,x∗
b). Agents believe that which of these two events occurs is also the result of an exogenous
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable, with the probability of (g,x∗
g) given by q. In this sense, an agent in the
Howitt-McAfee learning model is boundedly rational; she does not realize that the market conditions are
determined by the actions of other agents who hold the same beliefs as she does. All agents begin with a
diffuse prior over [0,1] for q, and hence their beliefs about p and q are independent.
In addition to the above restrictions on beliefs, the Howitt-McAfee framework imposes some restrictions
on the utility functions and on the timing of decisions during the learning process. First, the random variable
c must be a ﬁxed cost that enters utility in an additively separable fashion (as it does in the example in the
previous section). We assume thatthecostof choosingtechnology g isgivenbyγgcand thecostofchoosing
technology b by γbc. The examples in Sections 3 and 5 both have γg equal to one and γb equal to zero, but
the only important thing is that the cost affect the two technologies differently, that is, that γg 6= γb hold.
This separability assumption allows us to write Vgg (τ) as
Vgg (τ)=b Vgg (τ) − γgc,
10 Abstracting from the transition also allows us to avoid the question of how agents’ beliefs might be affected by changes in
government policy during the learning process. A change in policy could, for example, reset beliefs to the initial prior distribution.
If the model were dynamic but the government could not change policy during the transition, these issues do not arise; in this case
including welfare along the transition would not have much effect on the optimal policy. This is because economies that are highly
likely to converge to the good equilibrium also spend a large fraction of the transition “near” the good equilibrium.
11 Diffuse priors are a standard way of representing “minimal” prior knowledge about a parameter. See, for example, Zellner
(1971).
14where the term b Vgg (τ) does not depend on c.W ed e ﬁne b Vgb(τ), b Vbg (τ),a n db Vbb (τ) similarly. Next, the
restriction on the timing of decisions is as follows. At the beginning of period t, an agent ﬁrst chooses a
technology (g or b). She then observes which technology has been adopted by the “market” before deciding
on her level of investment. If, for example, she observes that the market has adopted g, then from the
form of her beliefs about at described above she knows that the market level of investment will be x∗
g.I f
she has also chosen technology g, then because of the separability assumption she will choose xi = x∗
g
regardless of her beliefs about the distribution of the cost variable. Similarly, if both she and the market
have chosen technology b, she will choose the investment level xi = x∗
b. Because all agents hold the same
beliefs at all points in time, they will all take the same actions and therefore the value of at will be either
(g,x∗
g) or (b,x∗
b), validating the beliefs described above. After investing, agents observe the realization
of the cost variable ct. They then use the observations of ct and at to update their beliefs about p and q
using Bayes’ rule, and the next period begins. As discussed above, the timing of decisions does not matter
in a rational expectations equilibrium, since each agent correctly anticipates market conditions. During
the learning process, however, agents’ beliefs are less precise and therefore this timing is important. We
choose this particular structure so that we can use the Howitt-McAfee learning process with a minimum of
modiﬁcations. The Howitt-McAfee process has a simple graphical representation that allows us to clearly
illustrate how policy affects the equilibrium selection process. We should emphasize, however, that the
details of the learning process are not critical for our story. Any of a broad class of adaptive processes could
be used (see Guesnerie and Woodford, 1992, and Woodford, 1990). The only real requirements are that the
process (i) converges to a rational expectations equilibrium with probability one and (ii) can converge to
each equilibrium with positive probability.
Because the information an agent receives is independent of the actions she takes, she will always max-
imize current-period expected utility. Expected utility is linear in probabilities and therefore depends only
on the means of the time-t beliefs about p and q, which we denote (pt,q t). The expected utility of each
choice at time t is given by
g : qtb Vgg +( 1− qt) b Vgb − γg
£
ptcL +( 1− pt)cH¤
b : qtb Vbg +( 1− qt) b Vbb − γb
£
ptcL +( 1− pt)cH¤
.
Straightforward algebra shows that an agent will choose g if we have12
qt ≥










b Vgg − b Vgb − b Vbg + b Vbb
. (10)
12 Here we are imposing the tie-breaking rule that agents choose g when they are indifferent. This is not important for the results;
the only real requirement is that all agents take the same action.
15For a given level of pt, the agent will prefer technology g if she thinks it is likely enough that other agents
will be choosing technology g. Following Howitt and McAfee (1992), we can represent this graphically as
in Figure 2, in which the box represents the set of all possible (pt,q t) pairs. We deﬁne G to be the set of













Figure 2: The dynamics of beliefs
We need to place some additional restrictions on the utility values in order for this process to generate a
well-behaved equilibrium selection mechanism. The statement of these restrictions depends on the relative
magnitudes of γg and γb, so we assume that γg > γb ≥ 0 holds, meaning that the cost variable has a larger













The two inequalities in the center of this expression simply state that both the good and the bad equilibrium
(strictly) exist. The leftmost inequality implies that if p were equal to one, then g would be the optimal
choice for the agent regardless of q.In other words, if the agent is optimistic enough about the cost variable
c, she will choose g regardless of her beliefs about market conditions. The rightmost inequality is the
reverse; it implies that if p were zero, then b would be the optimal choice regardless of q. Together, these
last two conditions imply that during the learning process agents believe it is possible that either one of
the equilibria exists or that both exist. Howitt and McAfee (1992) show that these assumptions guarantee
that the economy has positive probability of converging to each equilibrium from any current set of beliefs.
This prevents initial beliefs from having too strong of an effect on the ﬁnal outcome. It is straightforward to
show that the conditions given above imply that the line separating regions B and G is downward sloping,
16begins to the right of (0,1), ends to the left of (1,0), and crosses p in the interior of the box.
Bayesianupdatingallowsustowritethemeansofthebeliefdistributionsaftertobservationsasfunctions

















where ηt =( t +2 ) /(t +3 ) , for t =0 ,1,2,...This process has a nice representation in Figure 2. If the





and hence the value of q will increase. As Howitt and
McAfee (1992) point out, the posterior beliefs always lie on the line segment connecting the prior beliefs
with one of the corners of the box. From point x, for example, we would move to y if cH is observed and
to z if cL is observed. Similarly, if the original point is x0 (in region B), a =( b,x∗
b) will be observed, and
q will decrease. We move to point y0 if cH is observed and to z0 if cL is observed.
Suppose that in some period t, agents’ beliefs are represented by the point x in Figure 2. What will
the long-run behavior of the learning process be? The fact that the laws of evolution of the endogenous
variable at are determined in part by the learning process make this system self-referential: Agents are
learning about a system that is being inﬂuenced by the learning processes of others like themselves. In
particular, agents are not learning about a ﬁxed data-generating process (see Marcet and Sargent, 1989).
The limiting behavior of beliefs is especially complicated in such cases. We show below that Howitt and
McAfee’s learning rule satisﬁes an important (and strong) condition: convergence of beliefs to the self-
conﬁrming equilibrium beliefs (see Sargent, 1999). In other words, the learning process will converge to
a rational expectations equilibrium of the static model. To which equilibrium will the economy converge?
The answer depends crucially on the sequence of realizations {ct}. Because x is in region G, we know that
agents will choose g and hence qt will be rising. Suppose, however, that the economy is “unlucky” and
receives a string of realizations of cH. Then pt will be falling and eventually beliefs will cross into region
B. At this point, agents will begin to choose b and qt will start to fall. Bayesian updating consistently
estimates the value of p; that is, we have pt → p almost surely as t →∞ .W h e t h e rqt converges to zero or
one depends (roughly speaking) on whether beliefs are in region G or in region B when pt settles down. A
sufﬁciently unlucky sequence of realizations of ct will lead the economy into region B and therefore make
convergence to the bad equilibrium likely. Conversely, a sufﬁciently lucky economy will be driven into
region G, making convergence to the good equilibrium likely. Howitt and McAfee (1992) formalize this
argument, showing that the probability of converging to each equilibrium is positive. However, they do not
17show that the learning process necessarily converges. We now show that the process does indeed converge
with probability one.13 We then use monte carlo simulation to conﬁrm that the system only converges (with
positive probability) to the two rational expectations equilibria. These two results combine to show that
the learning process generates a valid equilibrium selection mechanism in accordance with our deﬁnition in
Section 2.2. The proof of the ﬁrst result and the description of the computations for the second are contained
in the appendix.
Proposition 2 The learning process {pt,q t} converges with probability one.
Proposition 3 Let π be the empirical probability of the set of sequences {ct} such that {pt,q t} → (p,1).
Thenthe empiricalprobabilityofthesetofsequences{ct}suchthat {pt,q t} → (p,0)isequalto(1 − π).In
other words, the simulation of the learning process always converges to a symmetric rational expectations
equilibrium of the static model.
We deﬁne our equilibrium selection mechanism to be the function π(τ) that: (i) takes on the value of π
delivered by Proposition 3 when τ is such that both equilibria strictly exist, and (ii) is equal to unity when
the bad equilibrium does not strictly exist.14 Note that when τ is changed, the dividing line in Figure 2
shifts and therefore the value π delivered by the learning process will typically change.
It is important to note that both the endogenous variables at and the exogenous random variables ct are
essential to our story. If the observation at time t used for updating beliefs contained only endogenous
variables, then given the initial prior distribution, the economy would always follow the same path during
the learning process.15 There would be no chance of convergence with positive probability to more than one
rational expectations equilibrium. By the same token, if the observation used for updating beliefs contained
only exogenous (random) variables then there would be only one possible convergence point for agents’
beliefs (the “true” distribution) and hence there would be no equilibrium selection problem.
Going back to the formulation of the optimal policy problem (4), notice that it is implicit there that the
policymakerknowsf,thetruedistributionoftherandomvariablec.Recallthatourinterestisindetermining
the optimal policy in the static, rational-expectations model of Section 2. In that context, the policymaker
must make a single choice τ, knowing f. This may seem somewhat at odds with our learning story – the
policymaker chooses τ while knowing f, and then agents begin to learn about f. We could instead change
13 Convergence is guaranteed in purely Bayesian models because beliefs form a martingale. This result does not apply to our
setting, however, because agents learn using a misspeciﬁed model. It is well known that in such an environment, learning need not
converge (hence the importance of this proposition). See Blume and Easley (1998) and Nyarko (1991).
14 When an equilibrium exists but is not strict, it requires agents to choose a weakly dominated strategy. Such equilibria are
typically not considered to be plausible outcomes. In any event, a non-strict equilibrium would be assigned a probability of zero
by the learning process if we weakened condition (11) to allow for this case.
15 In other words, if agents did not have to learn about the exogenous random variables, we could only look at the local stability
of each equilibrium with respect to agents’ beliefs about the endogenous variables. This would be analogous to studying the
expectational stability of the equilibria, as introduced in Evans (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (1992) (see also Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001). In our cases of interest, all equilibria will be locally stable in this sense, and thus local methods will not enable
us to formulate an optimal policy problem
18the original economy so that there is uncertainty about f, and impose that the policymaker choose τ while
having the same belief with which agents will begin the learning process. The analysis of the optimal policy
would be somewhat messier, but the effects that we highlight would still be present and important.16 The
reason we do not do this is that it changes the original problem. Our goal is to ﬁnd the optimal policy in
the model of Section 2, not in a noisy variation of it. In an equilibrium of our model of interest, everyone
(including the government) knows the true distribution f. However, if agents began the learning process
knowing f, their initial beliefs would uniquely determine the outcome and learning would not be selecting
the equilibrium. We also assume that the policymaker cannot change τ during the learning process or after
the economy has converged to an equilibrium. This again follows from the nature of the problem we begin
with. Our interest is in settings where the policy must be chosen before private agents choose their actions,
so that the question of equilibrium selection arises in the optimal policy problem. The learning process
occurs quickly, and then the equilibrium actions of private agents are observed. At this point it is too late
for the policy to be changed.17 If this were not the case, the policymaker could follow an equilibrium-
dependent strategy, which is a very different environment from the one we consider.
The dividing line in Figure 2 can be interpreted in a way that relates it to the risk factor of each equilib-
rium. In Figure 2, deﬁne q to be the level of q where the line separating the two regions crosses p. Then the
risk factor of equilibrium g is given by q, while that of equilibrium b is given by (1 − q). It is clear from
the diagram that this alone is not enough to determine the value of π; the position of the entire dividing
line matters. Because agents do not know p during the learning process, it matters how risky each strategy
seems for each possible belief p. This leads us to provide the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition: The risk factor of action g given belief p is the smallest probability ρg such that if an agent’s





with probability strictly greater than






b). The risk factor of action b given belief p
is given by ρb =1− ρg.
The risk factor of action g given belief p is equal to the height of the dividing line at p in Figure 2. (Note that
this is equal to one for low enough values of p and to zero for high enough values.) In the next proposition,
we show that enlarging the set G (by shifting the line down) strictly increases the probability of attaining the
good equilibrium. Hence, a change in the economy that uniformly lowers the risk factor of an equilibrium
action will increase the probability that the economy reaches that equilibrium.
16 The objective function would then be (4) integrated over the possible values of f.See Ennis and Keister (2002b), which studies
an economy where there is fundamental uncertainty about f and therefore takes this approach.
17 Imagine, for example, trying to collect additional sales tax on past transactions. Alternatively, one could think that changing
policies is costly or involves some time lags.
19Proposition 4 If the risk factor of action j ∈ {g,b} given belief p decreases for some p and does not
increase for any p, then the probability of convergence to equilibrium j strictly increases.
Even though the statement of this proposition is rather intuitive, the proof is fairly complex. It involves
establishing that when the dividing line in Figure 2 shifts, (i) the area between the new and old lines is
visited with positive probability and (ii) the asymptotic behavior of a trajectory that visits this area is
changed with positive probability. The proof is contained in the appendix.
The condition that the risk factor change uniformly for all beliefs p may seem strong, but changes in
the values of the b V variables have exactly this effect. This follows from the form of condition (10), which
deﬁnes the line separating the two regions in Figure 2. Moving any single b V term causes the line to shift
either uniformly up or uniformly down, which (using Proposition 4) makes the direction of the resulting
change in π unambiguous. This is important because it is through these terms that the policy parameter τ
affects π. We state this result as a corollary.
Corollary 1 The value of π is strictly increasing in b Vgg and b Vgb. It is strictly decreasing in b Vbb and b Vbg.
As a ﬁrst step in illustrating the implications of these results, we return to the example of Section 3. In
the next proposition, we show that when the Howitt-McAfee learning process is applied to the example, the
resulting equilibrium selection mechanism π is strictly increasing in τ. In other words, the learning process
generates the basic property of the function π that we claimed intuitively s h o u l dh o l d( s e eS e c t i o n3 . 2 ) .
Proposition 5 When the Howitt-McAfee learning process is applied to the example in Section 3, the re-
sulting π is strictly increasing in τ for τ < τ.
Theproofofthepropositioniscontainedintheappendix, buttheintuitionshouldbefairlyclear. Anincrease
in the subsidy will make agents willing to choose the good technology for a strictly larger set of beliefs. In
other words, the set G in Figure 2 becomes strictly larger, and hence the learning process is more likely to
converge to the good outcome.
Finding the actual optimal policy under this learning process obviously requires ﬁnding the actual values
of the function π, which can only be done by simulating the learning process numerically. If we are going to
simulate the model, however, we can do away with many of the simplifying assumptions of the example in
Section 3 (which were imposed so that the optimal policy problem could be presented graphically in Figure
1). In the next section, we show how additional insights can be generated by computing the equilibrium
selection mechanism and the optimal policy in a more general example.
5 A General Technology-Choice Problem
We now modify the example of Section 3 to study situations where there are two available technologies,
20both of which are subject to network externalities.18 There is again a continuum of identical agents whom
wenowthinkofasproducingasinglecommodity and consumingtheirownoutput. Eachagenthasavailable
two production technologies, g and b, and can operate only one of them. Both technologies again require

















The function h again represents the network externality, which now applies to both technologies. We
maintain all of our assumptions about h from the previous section, including h(0) > 0. We assume that
g>bholds, so that technology g has a higher marginal product than technology b for a given amount of
total effort. As before, there is a stochastic ﬁxed utility cost c of operating technology g.
We again assume that the government subsidizes effort. Let τ b et h er a t eo fad valorem subsidy and
let Θ be the lump-sum tax that ﬁnances this subsidy. We now assume that the same subsidy level must
apply to all effort; the government cannot distinguish effort devoted to technology b from effort devoted to
technology g. Likewise, the same tax is paid by all agents. In this way, we are not allowing the government
to pick the “winning” technology by subsidizing one and taxing the other. Instead, the government can only
encourage (or discourage) the entire industry.
5.1 Equilibrium
Regardless of the technology j ∈ {g,b} chosen by an agent, her optimization problem will resemble (6).





An agent compares the expected utility generated by each technology and chooses the more promising one.
We again look at symmetric equilibria, where all agents choose the same technology and therefore one of
the two numbers xj is positive and the other zero. We look ﬁrst for an equilibrium where xg is positive. As















18 A well-known example of such a situation was the adoption of video cassette recorders, with the competing Beta and VHS
technologies. See Katz and Shapiro (1986) and the references therein for a discussion of this and other examples.








We assume that the parameter values are such that Vgg (0) >V bg (0) holds and hence the good equilib-
rium exists when the government is passive. It is straightforward to show that this implies that the good
equilibrium exists for all values of τ.



















− c − Θb,
where Θb is deﬁned similarly to Θg above. We also assume that Vbb (0) >V gb(0) holds, so that the bad
equilibrium exists when there is no government intervention. In this example, the difference (Vbb − Vgb) is
strictly increasing in τ, which implies that the bad equilibrium exists for all values of τ. Hence, unlike in
the previous example, policy cannot be used here to eliminate the bad equilibrium. We also assume that the
conditions in (11) hold, and that we have Vgg (0) >V bb (0), so that g is indeed the good equilibrium.
5.2 Optimal Policy
Appealing to Propositions 2 and 3 gives us an equilibrium selection mechanism π. Because of the additional
complexity of this example(all of theV terms now depend directly on τ), drawing diagrams suchas those in
Figure 1 is not possible; therefore we move directly to numerical analysis. We use the following functional
form and parameter values
h(x)=( x +1 )
1
2 ,a=2,b=1,g=1 .4 ,c =0 .5
Furthermore, we take cH =2 ,c L = −1, and p = 1
2.
The resulting function π is presented in Figure 3. The function is strictly increasing, as expected; higher
subsidy rates beneﬁt both technologies, but make g relatively more attractive. The discontinuities come
from the discrete nature of the learning process. Some of the points in the box in Figure 2 are visited with
much higher probability than others, and the ﬁrst value of τ that causes such an “important” point to switch






prior beliefs, and hence is the starting point for every “run” of the learning process. This point falls in
region B if the government is passive. The ﬁrst value of τ that enlarges region G enough to contain this
22point is τ = .13.W h e nτ is raised to this value, every possible trajectory begins with an increase in q rather
than a decrease, which leads more trajectories to converge to q =1and thereby generates the ﬁrst discrete
j u m ps h o w ni nt h eﬁgure. Similarly, a fraction (1 − p) of the possible trajectories will begin with a high
realization of the ﬁxed cost. The ﬁrst value of τ that enlarges the region G enough so that the economy
stays in G after an initial high cost realization is given by τ =0 .31, which corresponds to the second large
jump in the ﬁgure. There are other, smaller points of discontinuity as well. As we discuss below, we have
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Figure 3: The equilibrium selection mechanism π(τ)
Table 1 presents the results of our computations for three different policy choices. The ﬁrst row, τ =
τ∗
b ≡ 0.185, shows the results when the subsidy level is chosen to maximize the utility of agents in the
bad equilibrium. The second row, τ = τ∗
g ≡ 0.225, presents the same information when τ is chosen to
maximize utility in the good equilibrium. The third row, τ = τ∗ ≡ 0.240, corresponds to the optimal
subsidy rate under probabilistic equilibrium selection. Notice that this optimal subsidy rate is larger than
both τ∗
b and τ∗
g! This result clearly demonstrates theimportance of considering equilibrium-selection effects
in determining the optimal policy. In this example, τ∗
b and τ∗
g are the obvious candidates for the government
to choose. A policymaker who faces uncertainty about which equilibrium will obtain might be tempted to
choose something in between these two values. Such an approach would be correct if π did not depend on
τ, as in a standard sunspots-based model. Our analysis shows, however, that for the given parameter values
s u c hac h o i c ei snot correct when equilibrium selection effects are taken into account. As the subsidy level
is increased beyond τ∗
g, the table shows that the utility value decreases for both of the equilibria. However,
the higher subsidy rate still makes the good technology a relatively more attractive choice, and hence the
probability of the good equilibrium is still increasing. As long as this effect is large enough (relative to the
23decreases in the utility values), expected utility continues to increase. We should emphasize that all three
of these values of τ fall in between the ﬁrst and second jumps in the π function in Figure 3, and hence the
presence of these discontinuities does not in any way affect our results.
Table 1
τ π Vgg Vbb EU
τ = τ∗
b 0.185 0.642 0.5706 0.4339 0.5217
τ = τ∗
g 0.225 0.678 0.5764 0.4318 0.5298
τ = τ∗ 0.240 0.703 0.5756 0.4297 0.5323
Notice that the government in this example does not need to know which technology is good and which
is bad, since the same subsidy level is applied to both. The point is that increasing the subsidy to the entire
industry will have a positive effect on equilibrium selection, simply because a subsidy has a larger effect
on the good technology and therefore makes it a relatively more attractive choice. This example shows
that policies designed to correct for network externalities can be substantially more powerful (and therefore
more important) than an analysis that ignores the equilibrium selection process would indicate.
6 Concluding Remarks
The main point of this paper is that using a probabilistic equilibrium selection mechanism can bring
models of coordination failure to bear on policy questions in interesting and informative ways. We believe
that the probabilistic view of equilibrium selection is both appealing and plausible, and we have shown how
adaptive learning naturally generates such a mechanism. We have also shown through examples that taking
the equilibrium selection effect into account can reveal some policies to be more potent than is commonly
recognized.
We use speciﬁce x a m p l e st om a k ew h a tw eb e l i e v ea r em o r eg eneral points, applicable to a wide class
of models with multiple equilibria. First, even when it is possible for the government to eliminate some bad
outcome as an equilibrium, it may not be optimal to do so. It may be optimal to permit a bad outcome to
occur with positive probability. Our approach takes into account both the costs and beneﬁts of decreasing
the probability of the bad equilibrium, and thereby can determine whether or not it is worthwhile to drive
this probability all the way to zero.
Second, it is often not optimal to maximize the welfare of agents in any one equilibrium. Deviating
slightly from such a policy will bring a small (second-order) loss in welfare if that equilibrium obtains,
but can often shift probability from a bad to a good equilibrium in a way that more than compensates for
this loss. This idea applies even in cases where the best policy from an equilibrium point of view does not
depend on which equilibrium is selected (as in our example in Section 3). If the best policy is the same for
each equilibrium, one might be tempted to think that the issue of equilibrium selection can be safely ignored
24and that this candidate policy should be chosen. However, we show this to be incorrect, because deviating
from that policy can make a good equilibrium more likely to obtain and therefore raise ex ante welfare.
In situations where there is a different best policy for each equilibrium, the same reasoning applies. In
our example in Section 5, the government would like to give a low subsidy if agents coordinate on the bad
technology, but would like to give a higher subsidy if agents coordinate on the good technology. Given that
the policymaker does not know which technology will be used when the policy is set, she might be tempted
to choose something in between the low and high levels. If equilibrium selection were independent of the
policy (as in the standard sunspots approach), this would be the correct answer. However, as the example
shows, the equilibrium selection effect requires that the optimal subsidy be larger than this “averaging”
approach would yield. In fact, the example shows that the optimal subsidy can be even larger than the high
level. Subsidizing the industry beneﬁts users of the good technology more, and hence makes agents willing
to choose the good technology for a wider range of beliefs. A government can therefore use policies of this
sort to encourage the adoption of good technologies, even if it does not know which of the technologies is
the better one.
25Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 2: The learning process {pt,q t} converges with probability one.
Proof: The dynamics of pt are independent of qt and represent a standard statistical learning process. Let
Ω be the set of all possible sequences {ct}
∞
t=1 and ω be an element of this set. Let A ⊂ Ω be the set of ω
such that pt (ω) → p; by the strong law of large numbers we know that the probability of the set A is one.
We will show that for each ω in A, the learning process converges.
Figure 4: Convergence of beliefs
Let the function q = φ(p) represent the line separating the regions G and B in Figure 4. Consider a
sequence of small numbers {εn} converging to zero. For each n, deﬁne
q1
n = φ(p + εn)
q2
n = φ(p − εn).
N o t i c et h a tw eh a v eq1
n < q<q 2
n for all n. Fix a particular ω in A, so that we know pt (ω) converges to p.
Then for each εn > 0, there exists a tn such that t>t n implies
|pt (ω) − p| < εn.
That is, for any small band around p, the sequence pt (ω) will eventually enter the band and never leave. If
qt (ω) is ever sufﬁciently low after this happens, that is, if we have
qt (ω) <q 1
n for any t ≥ tn, (A-1)
26then the trajectory will never switch regions again (because doing so would require leaving the ε-band).
Hence all future observations will involve all agents choosing b, and therefore qt will converge to zero.
Similarly, if we have
qt (ω) >q 2
n for any t ≥ tn, (A-2)
all future observations will involve all agents choosing g, and qt (ω) will converge to one. Therefore if, for
any n, either (A-1) or (A-2) is satisﬁed, the learning process converges to one of the two equilibria. The







for all t ≥ tn, for all n.
The continuity of φ implies that q1
n and q2
n both converge to q as n goes to inﬁnity, so in this case qt (ω)
must converge to q. This establishes our claim. ¥
Proposition 3: Let π be the empirical probability of the set of sequences {ct} such that {pt,q t} → (p,1).
Then the empirical probability of the set of sequences {ct} such that {pt,q t} → (p,0) is equal to (1 − π).
In other words, the simulation of the learning process always converges to a symmetric rational expectations
equilibrium.
Proof: Note that, because of Proposition 2, we only need to verify that the system does not converge to the
point (p,q). The law of motion for qt has a discontinuity along the dividing line in Figure 4, which passes
through (p,q). This makes the asymptotic behavior around that point very difﬁcult to study analytically.
For this reason, we turn to a numerical methodology. From (10), we have that the curve separating regions
G and B is linear, i.e., of the form
q = α − βp.
Without loss of generality, we ﬁx p =0 .5. Then, the parameters α and β must satisfy the following two
conditions:







≤ α ≤ β.
We construct a grid of points over this two-dimensional parameter space to cover all the possible shapes
of the dividing line. For this purpose we deﬁne two auxiliary variables x and y, with x ∈ (0,0.5) and
y ∈ (0.5,1) and deﬁne β ≡ 1/(y − x) and α ≡ y/(y − x). It is not hard to show that the values of α
and β obtained in this manner satisfy the conditions above. We then construct a grid of values of x and y
containing a total of 20 points in each dimension. For each such point, we compute α and β and we simulate
1,000 runs of the learning process.
27We set convergence bounds for qt in the following manner. First we compute q. Then we deﬁne the
variables boundG =m i n {(1 − q)/5,0.1} and boundB =m i n {q/5,0.1}. When qt goes beyond boundG
and the system has not switched zones for the last 2,000 iterations, we say the economy has converged to
the good equilibrium. For the bad equilibrium we use a similar procedure when qt goes below boundB.I f
neither of these events has occurred after 300,000 iterations, we say that the economy did not converge to
one of the two equilibria. (This would be the case, for example, if qt were to converge to q.)
The convergence bounds may seem somewhat large, but it should be kept in mind that the step size
of a Bayesian learning process decreases fairly rapidly. As an example, a process that reaches qt =0 .1
after 2,000 steps and that continues monotonically approaching the bad equilibrium will take over 18,000
more steps to reach qt =0 .01.19 As a result, tightening the convergence bounds is computationally very
expensive. However, this small step size also means that the probability of a sequence switching regions
after not having switched in the previous 2,000 iterations is minuscule.
In every case, the system converged to one of the two rational expectation equilibria. In fact, the process
never switches regions after the ﬁrst quarter of the total number of possible iterations. Based on these
computations, we claim that the empirical support of the limit of the learning process is the two rational
expectations equilibria. The Fortran code is available from the authors upon request. ¥
Proposition 4: If the risk factor of action j ∈ {g,b} given belief p decreases for some p and does not
increase for any p, then the probability of equilibrium j strictly increases.
The proof of this proposition is fairly long so we ﬁrst offer a brief discussion. It is fairly straightforward
to see that the probability of equilibrium j cannot decrease. Suppose the dividing line in Figure 4 shifts
in such a way that the new region G strictly contains the old one. Pick any ω in Ω and let (pt,q t) be the
sequence generated by ω before the shift, and (e pt, e qt) t h es e q u e n c ea f t e r w a r d s .T h e nw eh a v e
e pt = pt and e qt ≥ qt for all t.
This implies that if (pt,q t) converged to (p,1) before the change, it will still do so after the change and
therefore π cannot decrease.
Showing that the probability actually increases requires us to show that there is a positive-probability
subset Ω1 ⊂ Ω such that for all ω ∈ Ω1 we have qt(ω) → 0 but e qt(ω) → 1. T h i st a s ki sm u c hm o r e
difﬁcult because it requires establishing speciﬁc properties of the (probabilistic) behavior of trajectories in
the box. We establish this result in two steps. First, we show that there is a positive-probability subset of
Ω, call it Ω2, such that the sequences (pt,q t) g e n e r a t e db ya l lω ∈ Ω2 visit the area between the new and
19 Using the equation qt+1 = ηtqt, it can be shown that qt+n =[ ( t+2)/(t+2+n)]qt and hence that n =( t+2)[(qt/qt+n)−1]
holds. For the numbers above, this gives us n =2 ,002(10 − 1) = 18,018.
28the old dividing line and hence their asymptotic behavior is potentially affected by the change in the line.
This result is a consequence of our Lemma 1 below. Second, we show that there is a positive-probability
subset Ω1 ⊂ Ω2 such that for all ω in this set, once the sequence (pt,q t) enters the area between the two
dividing lines, it never changes regions again and hence its asymptotic behavior is necessarily affected by
the change. This result follows from lemmas 2 and 3 below.
We now formally state and prove the three lemmas and then use them to prove the proposition. Our ﬁrst
lemma applies for a ﬁxed dividing line φ and shows that any open set near enough to the center of the box
is visited with positive probability. Let p1 and p2 denote the values of p at which φ intersects the top and
the bottom of the box, respectively (see Figure 5). Note that condition (11) implies that p1 < p<p 2 holds.
Lemma 1:F i xa n yt0 ≥ 0, any starting point (pt0,q t0), any target point (b p, b q) with p1 < b p<p 2, and any
ε > 0. Then there exists a ﬁnite number T ≥ t0 and a sequence {ct}T
t=t0 such that the trajectory from
(pt0,q t0) is within ε of (b p, b q) at time T.
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 : Suppose (b p, b q) is below the line φ, as depicted in Figure 5. (The reverse case is
completely symmetric.) Draw the line segment starting at the origin, running through (b p, b q) a n de n d i n go n
φ. Let (e p, e q) denote the endpoint of this segment on φ, and let x denote the entire segment. Consider a band
around this segment with width δ =
√
2ε (so that a δ-square around (b p, b q) falls both inside this band and
inside the ε-ball). Notice that if a trajectory enters this band between (b p, b q) and (e p, e q) when the maximum
step size is less than δ, a long enough sequence of consecutive ct = H realizations will lead the trajectory
to land in the ε-ball, as desired.
Next, draw the line from (0,1) passing through (e p, e q); denote this line y. Also draw the parallel line
segment that intersects φ at the same point as the lower bound of the δ-band and continues to the right.
Denote this segment by y0. Suppose that a trajectory lands in the strip between y and y0 when the maximum
step size is less than δ. Then, a sufﬁciently long sequence of ct = H realizations will lead the trajectory
to ﬁrst cross φ into the δ-band around x, a n dt ot h e nl a n di nt h eε-ball around (b p, b q), as desired. All that
remains, therefore, is to show that for an arbitrary starting point and time, there exists a ﬁnite sequence of
realizations that will lead the trajectory to land in this strip at a time when the maximum step size is less
than δ.
To do this, we use the lines y and φ to divide the box into three regions as labelled in Figure 5. First,
suppose (pt0,q t0) is in region 1. Then a long enough sequence of consecutive ct = H realizations will bring
the trajectory into region 2. From any point in region 2, a long enough sequence of ct = H realizations will
make qt < e q, and then a long enough sequence of ct = L realizations will take the trajectory into region
3.20



















Figure 5: Visiting a neighborhood of (b p, b q)
From any point in region 3, a long enough sequence of ct = H realizations will lead the trajectory to
either (i) land in the strip between y and y0 or (ii) step across this strip and land in region 1. Notice that if
t is large enough (so that the step size is small enough), the former will necessarily occur. If (ii) occurs,
the above process can be repeated to construct a (long but ﬁnite) sequence of realizations that leads the
trajectory to cycle until (i) occurs. Because the maximum step size is converging to zero, (i) must occur
with a maximum step size of less than δ in ﬁnite time. ¥
Note that all the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1 involve ﬁnite sequences of speciﬁc realizations
of ct and hence involve events that would occur with (perhaps very low but) positive probability. In other
words, starting from any point, the probability of entering any open set containing values of p between p1
and p2 is positive. The next lemma shows that once a target neighborhood is reached, pt can stay in that
neighborhood for arbitrarily long periods of time.
Lemma 2:P i c ka n ypT ∈ (0,1),a n yε > 0, and any N ≥ 1. Let T be large enough that the maximum step
size of pt is less than ε. Then there exists a sequence of realizations {ct}
T+N
t=T such that pt remains in the
interval (pT − ε,p T + ε) for all t satisfying T ≤ t ≤ T + N.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : If pt ≤ pT, then a realization of ct = L will ensure that pt+1 is in the desired
interval. If pt ≥ pT, then a realization of ct = H will do the same. This allows one to construct a sequence
of realizations of arbitrary length that keeps pt within ε of pT. ¥
switching to ct = H will lead to the desired result if the maximum step size is less than δ.
30Lemma 2 shows that the behavior of pt can be “controlled” for ﬁnite periods of time using events of positive
probability. The next lemma provides an inﬁnite-period counterpart, showing that the probability of staying
in any neighborhood of p is positive in the long run.
Lemma 3:F i xa n yε > 0 and any T large enough that the maximum step size of p at T is less than ε.
Suppose we have a partial history of realizations ωT = {ct}
T




pt ∈ (p − ε,p + ε) for all t ≥ T | ωT¤
> 0.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : Suppose this is not true. Then there exists an ε > 0,aT ≥ 1 (where the maximum
step size of p is less than ε), and a partial history ωT with pT ∈ (p − ε,p + ε) such that
Pr
£
pt / ∈ (p − ε,p + ε) for some t>T| ωT¤
=1 . (A-3)
Pick an arbitrary partial history ω
b T such that the generated partial trajectory {b pt}
b T
t=1 (which does not
necessarily pass through the point pT above) has b pb T ∈ (p − ε,p + ε). Returning to our original partial
history ωT, we can construct a ﬁnite sequence of N realizations that will lead the trajectory {pt}
T+N
t=T to (i)





















Notice that b pb T must be a rational number and can therefore be written as the ratio of two integers I and J.
For the partial history ωT, deﬁne
















The integers I and J can be chosen large enough that NL and NH are bothnon-negative and that T+N ≥ T
holds, where N = NH + NL. Then appending a sequence of N realizations, NL of which are ct = L,t o
the partial history ωT will lead the trajectory to land on b pb T at time T + N, satisfying (ii) above. These
realizations can be ordered as in Lemma 2 to keep pt in the ε-band around p so that (i) is also satisﬁed.
31(As long as positive numbers of both types of realizations remain, move in the direction of p. Then the last
string of (identical) realizations will lead monotonically to b pb T.)
Because it is of ﬁnite length, this string of N realizations follows ωT with positive probability. By (i),
the trajectory has not exited the ε-band around p between periods T and T +N. Therefore, by (A-3) it must
do so after time T + N with probability one. In other words, we have
Pr
£
pt / ∈ (p − ε,p + ε) for some t>T+ N | ωT+N¤
=1 .
However, any continuation history that, when appended to ωT+N, causes pt to exit the ε-band for some
t will also cause b pt to exit the ε-band when appended to ω
b T. This is because the step size at T + N is
smaller than at b T,s ot h a tpt will be closer to their common starting point
¡
b pb T = pT+N
¢
than is b pt for every
t. Recall that (by independence) the set of continuation histories and their probabilities is the same after
every partial history. Therefore the probability of exiting the ε-band following ω
b T is at least as great as that
following ωT+N, which is unity. Therefore we have
Pr
h




This is true for any partial history ω
b T at any time that it enters the ε-band – it must exit the band with
probability one. This implies that if we look at complete histories ω, we must have
Pr[pt / ∈ (p − ε,p + ε) inﬁnitely often]=1 ,
which contradicts the strong law of large numbers. ¥
In other words, this lemma shows that if the trajectories following some partial history were driven away
from p with probability one, the same would be true for the trajectories following every partial history. This
would imply that convergence to p is a zero-probability event, which we know is false.
We now use these lemmas to prove Proposition 4.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :We will focus on the case where the dividing line shifts in such a way that the
risk factor of action g decreases, as depicted in Figure 6. The reverse case is completely symmetric. Let φ1
denote the dividing line before the change and φ2 the line afterwards. Let ∆ denote the set of points lying
between the two dividing lines and between the vertical lines at p1 and p2 (where the original dividing line
intersects the top and the bottom of the box). Note that ∆ has a non-empty interior and necessarily contains
points with p<p.
Pick an arbitrary open ball in the set ∆, and let 2ε be the radius of this ball. Consider the ε-ball centered
















Figure 6: Asymptotic behavior depends on φ
Then Lemma 1 tells us that there is a ﬁnite number T ≥ t0 and a sequence of realizations {ct}
T
t=0 such
that, under the dynamics generated by the dividing line φ1, (pT,q T) falls in the ε-ball. Let ωT denote this
partial history. The dynamics generated by the dividing line φ2 under ωT will lead to the same pT (since
the behavior of pt is independent of the dividing line) and to some e qT ≥ qT.
Notice that the ε-ball around (pT,q T) is also contained in the set ∆ (this was the reason for the 2ε radius
of the original ball). Compute the number of steps N that would be required to move q from qT to below
q. Then from Lemma 2 we know that there is a sequence of N realizations such that pt stays in the interval
(pT − ε,p T + ε), and therefore the trajectory does not switch regions between periods T and T +N (using
either dividing line). Let ωT+N denote the partial history in which these N realizations are appended to
ωT. This partial history leads the trajectory to a point like a in Figure 6 at time T + N when the line is φ1
a n dt oap o i n tl i k eb when the line is φ2.
Next, draw a line from (pT + ε,q) to (0,1).L e te p be the value of p where this line crosses φ2. Note
that e p>p must hold. Also note that if pt stays in the interval (pT − ε, e p) for all future t, the trajectory
from point a will never change regions and will therefore converge to q =0 . Likewise, under the same
restriction, the trajectory from point b will converge to q =1 . Lemma 3 t e l l su st h a tw eh a v e 21
Pr
£
pt ∈ (pT − ε, e p) for all t>T+ N | ωT+N¤
> 0.
21 The asymmetry of the bounds around p is not important here. We could impose symmetric bounds as in Lemma 3 and then use
a ﬁnite sequence of realizations to lead the trajectory into these bounds. We skip this simply to avoid introducing further notation.
33Let D be the set of ω ∈ Ω that begin with the partial history ωT+N a n dt h e nr e m a i ni nt h ei n t e r v a l
(pT − ε, e p) for all t ≥ T + N. By construction, the trajectory generated by any ω ∈ D would have con-
verged to (p,0) with the dividing line φ1, but converges to (p,1) with the dividing line φ2. The probability






pt ∈ (pT − ε, e p) for all t>T+ N | ωT+N¤
,
which is positive because both terms on the right-hand side are positive. In addition, as discussed above, any
ω that led the economy to converge to (p,1) under the dividing line φ1 will do the same under the dividing
line φ2. Therefore the probability of the set of sequences that lead the economy to converge to (p,1) has
strictly increased. ¥
Proposition 5: When the Howitt-McAfee learning processi sa p p l i e dt ot h ee x a m p l ei nS e c t i o n3 ,t h e
resulting π is strictly increasing in τ for τ < τ.
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qt.
We ﬁrst look at the value of pt when qt is equal to unity (that is, the value of pt such that agents would need
to be certain that xg = x∗
g in order to be willing to choose technology g). This is given by
p1 =
1
2a + cH − a







From (8), we see that x∗
g is strictly increasing in τ and also that a












. This latter term is strictly increasing in x∗
g and hence in τ. This demonstrates that p1 is strictly
decreasing in τ. In Figure 2, this means that as τ increases, the intersection of the dividing line with the top
of the box moves to the left.
We next examine the change in the intersection of the dividing line with the bottom of the box. This is
34the value of pt when qt is equal to zero, which is given by
p2 =
1





This is clearly also decreasing in τ, and hence this intersection moves to the left as well. Hence, a small
increase in τ decreases the risk factor of action g given belief p for all p in
¡
p1,p 2¢
. The risk factor for all
other values is unchanged. Therefore, by Proposition 4, π strictly increases. ¥
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